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The discussion whether the unprecedented size of Charles the Fifth's world-empire 
warranted to him some kind of «universal monarchy», aróse as early as his election 
as Román Emperor. From 1519 onwards, chancellor Gattinara launched the idea that 
the imperial title procured rights to a world hegemony. His views have been commented 
extensively in the propagandistic writings of the time, both form the Valois and the 
Habsburg sides; historians in their tum paid wide attention to them. However, as the 
distance grew between the emperor and his chancellor since 1525, we have to distinguish 
clearly between ideology and political practice '. Por Charles himself, his tide had mainly 
a meaning in the tradition of the Román emperors, imbued with a theological mission 
of protection of the Church, keeping peace among the Christians and defence of Chris-
tendom against the heathen. The emperor's special responsibility not only legitimated 
his actions against the Ottomans and their allies, it also made him consider anybody 
as his enemy who opposed his endeavours to establish peace among the Christians ^ . 
Formulated in this way, one can discem a reügious and a profane component in the 
emperor's mission. Although one can attribute some of Charles's political decisions to 
that theological inspiration, the question deserves to be raised in how far exactly these 
arguments or maybe other, of a more down-to-earth kind, may have motivated his 
actions. On a secular basis, the preservation of the unity of the Habsburg dynasty and 
the expansión of its territories may just as much have driven the emperor as his dignity 
as the «Rex regum». Moreover, for the sake of propaganda the \vorldly arguments may 
well have been hidden behind more elevated ones. Since very few unequivocal personal 
statements by the mature Charles have been preservad, the whole discussion of his 
political ideáis therefore needs to be tested by his actions. 
' HEADLEY, J, M., The emperor and his chancellor. A studj of the imperial chancellery under Gattinara, 
Cambridge, 1983, and his contribution to this volume. 
^ KOHLER, A., Karl V 1Í00AÍÍ8. Eme Biographíe, Munich, 1999, pp. 94-100. 
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Such a test requires an insight in the strategic options any ruler in his position 
would have had to envisage. Moreover, one needs to evalúate his attitude in practica: 
in how far can it be understood from his principies, either religious or secular, or even 
a combination of both? Can we distinguish the propaganda as it was deemed necessary 
for the justification of political behaviour of the kings form their real motives? Don't 
we have many indications of Charles's preparedness to negotiate on a very pragmatic 
basis? It may be worth to systematize his evaluations, cholees and decisions in one 
sense or the other. Finally, the question may be raised in how far Charles's alleged 
ideological or strategic visions might have contributed to his ultímate failure to reach 
his goals. If he could be pragmatic in many respects, why was he obstínate and hard-
minded in some others? Was this lack of flexibiüty in the last instance not the main 
reason for his failure to preserve the unity of his empire, that of his dynasty and that 
of westem Christendom? 
In order to examine these questions, I shall first consider more closely five domains 
in which Charles has shown his tough mind and for which he was prepared to invest 
great efforts. In a second section, this paper will discuss equally five domains in which 
we can observe the emperor's pragmatism. Finally, the strategic possibÜities and nec-
essities wül have to be evaluated. 
The fírst domain will be that of the imperial authority. The emperor considered 
the prerogatives of the unique dignity which had been bestowed upon him as a gracious 
gjft from God and therefore as an unaüenable mission. In his mind, it gave him pre-
eminence over other Christian kings about which no discussion was possible. The main 
field where he tried to implement this role, was that of his frequently declared ambition 
to take the lead of a crusade against the Turks. When in 1529 Pope Clement Vil 
suggested to Charles that King Francis I would be prepared to join him on an crusade 
if the leadership could be shared between them, he simply refuted this idea ' . Instead, 
throughout the 1520s, he repeatedly tried in various treaties to impose on Francis and 
Henry to foUow him on a crusade against the Turks. Nothing of this kind ever happened, 
even not after Charles's extensive complaint before the Cardinals in Rome in 1536 
that Francis had treacherously launched an attack against the duchy of Savoy whÜe 
he himself was just on his way back from fighting the infidel in Tunis, which campaign 
had been officially labeUed as a crusade. But Charles kept stubbomly to his idea, and 
even in the treaty of Crépy of September 1544 he gave up all his territorial gains in 
northem France, acquired after months of campaigning with a huge army under his 
personal command, in retum for Francis's promises of support against the Turks, descri-
bed in detaü as 600 men heavy cavalry and 10,000 infantrymen "*. The idea of the imperial 
supremacy could not be expressed more clearly by any other mission than a crusade. 
^ RODRÍGUEZ SALGADO, M . J . , «The Ten Commandments», en BLOCKMANS, W . P . , y MOUT, M . E . H . 
N. (eds.), The World of Charles the Fifth, Amsterdam, 2001 (in preparation). 
* KoHLER, A., Karl V..., op. at., p . 293. 
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From the Tunis campaign in 1535 onwards, Charles took personally the lead of all 
his major campaigns, while before his coronation by the pope he had left the battlefíelds 
to his generáis. He took his crusading mission so deeply serious, that in his mind even 
his wars against France and its allies got a touch of holiness since they prevented him 
to fulfil his holy mission. 
In cormection to the uniqueness of the imperial authority, one can also mention 
Charles's harsh endeavours to secure it for his son and successor Philip after his brother 
Ferdinand's death. In the difficult negotiations at held Augsburg in the winter 1550-1551 
between the emperor and his brother about their succession, Charles knew that the 
Germán constitutional tradition as well as loyalty to his brother imposed the imperial 
crown to pass to the Román King, which had been Ferdinand's title since January 1531. 
However, he failed to see that the Germán Prince-Electors would oppose strongly to 
the idea of electing Philip as Román King, which he himself tried very hard to push 
forward. His view of one emperor, one Habsburg unión, one confession was coherent 
but outdated. The heavy clashes about the succession between the two brothers reveal 
Ferdinand's more flexible attitude towards poHtical and religious reality than Charles's, 
and probably his better insight in the power relations within the empire '. 
The second domain in which Charles's attitude can be considered to be tough and 
fírmly keeping up his high principies, is that of the respect due to his imperial authority. 
Especiaüy during the 1540s, we can observe the concepts of lese-majesty and «absolute 
imperial authority» to be invoked frequently to imp>ose his policy. The first concept 
was applied systematicaMy and demonstratively in the repression of urban revolts. The 
most impressive case certainly was that of his native city of Ghent, which had opposed 
to stem tax demands in 1537, as a consequence of which relations between the gov-
emment and the city deteriorated so heavüy that Charles's constitutional act, granted 
at his inauguration in 1515, had been pubUcly cut into shreds, officials had been put 
under serious threats and a new local administration had been installed. FoUowing the 
proposals of his leamed councillor jurist Louis Van Schore, the city was formally sen-
tenced for lese-majesty, which implied the loss of her privileges and property, while 
the guilty had eamed death penalty. In a demonstrative act. Charles «conceded» a 
revisión of the urban constitution after the symbolic submission of five hundred leaders 
of the revolt, all kneeling before him in their underwear, bareheaded, barefoot and 
with nooses around their necks as a reference to the penalty they really had deserved *. 
The so-called treachery of the episcopal city of Thérouanne, which belonged to the 
kingdom of France, and of Hesdin was punished by their destruction by the emperor's 
troops in 1553, «qu'ils rasent jusqu'au sol» says the celebrated historian Henri Pirenne, 
as if it were the most normal thing to do. In the tradition of the romano-canonic law. 
' Ibidem, pp. 331-337, 
'' DECAWLE, J., y V.w PETEGHEM, P., «Ghent "absolutely" broken», en DECAVELE, J. (ed.), Ghent. In 
defence of a rehelUous city, Antu'erp, 1989, pp. 107-113. 
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a prince was entitled to the destruction of a city; it was indeed to Carthage that Van 
Schore was referring in his requisitory against Ghent: «debvroit estre submise a la chaine 
comme fust Cartaege par les Romains, sans jamáis pouvoir porter nom de viUe» ^. 
In 1542, the govemment put proposals for new levies to the States of the various 
provinces of the Low Countries. After long drawn-out negotiations and firm resistance 
from especially the merchants, the govemess Mary of Hungry decided to enforce the 
tax «by virtue of the absolute authority of the emperor» *. This authoritarian attitude 
proved not to be rewarding since the revenue of the imposed taxes remained very much 
below the expectations, as a consequence of passive resistance. Indeed, it tended to 
negate the States' secular tradition of being entided to grant or withhold additional 
subsidies beyond the normal feudal cases. In those years, Charles equally tended to 
impose his imperial authority by forcé and ceremony vis-á-vis opposing princes. In Sep-
tember 1543, he made Duke WiUiam of Cleves fall prostrate before him after the occu-
pation of the duchy of Gueldres and forced him to remarry with a Habsburg princess. 
In his campaign against the protestant princes in 1546 and 1547, Charles equally 
showed himself from his most proud and harsh side by requiring the prostration of 
the oíd Duke Uhich of Wurttemberg. The case of felony was raised against John-Frederic, 
Elector of Saxony, who was kept as a prisoner in the emperor's foUowing. The same 
fate was inflicted upon Philip, Landgrave of Hesse, although he had come to the emperor 
imder the promise to be left free in person and property'. As is well known, the Germán 
princes were so deeply appalled by the emperor's treatment of their peers, that this 
became the reason for their revolt in 1552 which would ultimately lead to Charles's 
disgraceful retreat from Germany. In purely political terms, he evidently had overplayed 
his hand in situations where no doubt can exist about his personal involvement. These 
four episodes of Charles's «magnificence» belonged typically to the twelve victories 
or «Triumphs» Philip 11 commissioned with Maarten van Heemskerck to be propagated 
in engravings pubHshed in 1555-1556. 
The third domain in which Charles can be seen as uncompromising is that of his 
relation as Emperor towards the catholic Church and towards the successive popes, 
in particular. Charles has focused his entire policy on his role as the first protector 
of Christianity and of the Catholic Church. Therefore, his relations with the successive 
popes were absolutely central. After his initial success with the election of his preceptor 
and counciUor Adrián of Utrecht, the latter's sudden death in 1523 left the emperor 
with Medid and Famese popes whose prime interests lay in Italian politics and in the 
avoidance of imperial hegemony. They showed litde interest in Charles's stubbom con-
cern with the intemal reform of the Church —such as his preceptors in the Low Coun-
' BooNE, M., «Destructions des villes et menaces de destruction, éléments du discours princier aux 
Pays-Bas bourguignons», en KÓRNER, M . (ed.), Destruction and Reconstruction of Towns, Bem, 2000, U, 
pp. 104-105; PKENNE, H. , Histoire de Belgique, Brussels, 1923, III, p. 144. 
" TR^CY, J. D., Afinancid revolution in the Habsburg Netherknds, Berkeley, 1985, pp. 81-91. 
' KOHLER, A., Karl V..., op. cit., pp. 314-318. 
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tries had taught him, and as the majority of the Germán Diet, including most Catholics, 
wished to see implemented. The cardinals and Pope Clement VE even had good reasons 
to fear any attempt to criticise the current practices in the Church, and therefore opposed 
vehemently Charles's —or rather Adrian's— idea of calling a general council. Never-
theless, as time went on, Charles's policy towards the Germán protestants implied ever 
more strongly the discussion in a general council, to be held within the borders of 
the Holy Román Empire, of the dogmatic and organizational matters raised by the 
Reformation movement. 
Charles targeted his entire policy on his role as the miles Christi par excellence. This 
is how he had Titian etemalised his portrait right after the Mühlberg battle in 1547, 
and later on how he was sculpted by the Leoni's. In 1535, he took personally the 
lead of what was called a crusade, the expedition against the MusHm occupation of 
Tunis. He would be heading in person all major batdes during the next twenty years, 
exposing himself to real dangers such as passing buUets, and to physical strain and 
pain. AH his battles got a religious connotation, even those against France, since they 
either prevented him to take action against the infidel or the heretics, or, even worse, 
the king of France even made alliances with these enemies of Christianity. Charles 
made his purpose most of all clear in the Crépy Treaty in 1544: after a major and 
rather successful joint campaign with King Henry VUI, he gave up both his territorial 
gains and his alliance with Henry just to oblige Francis to commit himself to particípate 
in a Crusade, to end his support to the Germán protestants, and to support the con-
vention of the Trent Council. 
Charles always behaved very respectful towards the successive popes, even when 
they did not show the same involvement in the defence of the Church and of Christianity 
as he did. In his instructions for his son Philip from 1548, he admitted that the popes 
had not really served him well in the past —the last reference he implied was the 
withdrawal of papal troops the year before in the midst of the campaign against the 
Germán protestant princes. Nevertheless, he insisted that Philip «should always behave 
as a good and obedient son of the Church, and without providing the popes with a 
good reason of discontent with him», «con la sumisión que un buen hijo de la Iglesia 
lo debe hacer, y sin dar a los papas justa causa de mal contentamiento vuestro» '". 
Clement VII and Paul IH had postponed the convention of a council during nearly 
twenty years. Paul did nothing, when it finaUy convened since December 1545, to avoid 
the traditionaüst majority of the council fathers making any open debate with the prot-
estants impossible. He had agreed with the transfer of the Council from Trent to Bologna, 
which would exelude the participation of the Germán protestants, which had painfully 
been convinced by Charles's diplomacy to meet somewhere within the borders of the 
Holy Román Empire. By their attitude, the popes and the cardinals wrecked Charles's 
long lasting efforts to keep negotiations with the protestants open, and to try and keep 
FERNÁNDEZ ÁLVAREZ, M., Corpus documental de Carlos V, Salamanca, 1971-1981,11, p. 577. 
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them within a reforming Catholic Church. This failure finally made the emperor's position 
in the Empire impwssible, since all his endeavours since 1530 to continué talks and 
to make provisional concessions in the hope of a nearby settlement by a councÜ, by 
1548 proved to mere chimeras. Charles did not cany on his threat, launched after 
long hesitations in 1548, to continué the Trent councÜ under his own authority *'. Even 
after these disiUusions, he remained loyal and obedient to the pope and admonished 
his son to behave similarly. 
One really wonders if Charles was so ül-informed about the intentions of the papal 
Curia that he focused all his hopes upon their benevolence and insight. By putting 
all his assets upon this option, he made himself extremely vulnerable and dependent 
on Rome. He had already shown to be more consequent in his strife to protect the 
unity of the Church than the popes themselves, but he failed to see the Curia's reluctance 
to discuss its own wheeling and dealing. The primacy of Charles's poHcy lay in matters 
strictly connected with religión, whñe the popes pursued primarily secular targets. He 
did not condude from his repeated failures to convince Clement Vil and Paul IH, 
that his conception of a universal Catholic Empire lacked any solid basis. When, by 
1548 his main option had shown to be chimerical, he lacked the flexibility to adapt 
to the situation. Other rulers, such as Henry Vin or Francis I showed to be much 
less dogmatic. Even Ferdinand had drawn other conclusions from the situation than 
his brother: he took his distance from Rome —eventually he did not take care of papal 
coronation any more— and took the irreversibility of Protestantism for granted. 
The fourth domain in which one can see Charles's attitude as uncompromising is 
that of the unity of the Habsburg dynasty. From his very fírst personal contacts with 
his brother, he unambiguously insisted upon his priority rights as the eldest heir; in 
this context, he chased Ferdinand quickly out of Spain in 1518 and claimed without 
any concession his nomination as the Román King. During the whole of Charles's reign, 
Ferdinand had to obey to the emperor's instructions, as had their sisters. The unity 
of the dynasty had to be conceived as a unity of its direction. This system worked 
rather well untÜ the succession crisis in the 1550-1551 winter, when Ferdinand for 
the first time refused to let Charles's views and dynastic interests prevaü not only on 
his own, but also on what he considered to be the interest of the empire. The compromise 
reached through the delicate mediation of Mary of Hungary, would never be imple-
mented, as a consequence of the revolt of the protestant princes, including most of 
the North-German rulers who opposed both the alleged Habsburg inheritance rights 
and the «Spanish tyranny» under which they felt to be subdued. 
The impossibility to achieve his principal targets of the dynastic unity under his 
or his son's leadership, and the unity of empire and Church under the joint leadership 
of pope and emperor, brought Charles from 1553 onwards to withdraw from the empire 
" KoHLER, A., Karl y . , op. cit., p. 324. 
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and to refuse to take any responsibility for political acts the imperial Diet might take 
against his own conscience. 
A related aspect of Charles's firm opinión on the dynasty, is his concept of legitimacy. 
We already discussed his high thinking of the rights of the emperor. As the head of 
the Habsburg dynasty, he feh responsible for the preservation of their patrimonial rights. 
Although he did not take any serious action for the recovery of the duchy of Burgundy, 
on which he had raised strong claims in the Madrid treaty of 1526, and on which 
he continued to insist in legal terms in the Cambrai treaty of 1529, he negotiated again 
about these rights in the Crépy treaty of 1544 " . Inversely, Charles limited his military 
actions strictly to territories upon which either the empire or his dynasty had oíd claims. 
In Lombardy, Tuscany and Lorraine these belonged to the empire, in North África, 
Naples and Navarre to the Trastamara dynasty, and in Toumai, Luxemburg, Friesland 
and Guelders to the Burgundians. Even the 1536 invasión in the Provence took place 
in a formerly imperial territory which had been promised to his ally Charles de Bourbon. 
The occupation of Cambrai in 1543 equally concemed an imperial fief. On the other 
hand, the legally untenable invasión in Champagne in 1544 was given up after months 
only, since it simply seemed to have been meant as a means to put pressure on Francis 
I to make him join the emperor in his principal missions: to launch a crusade against 
the heathen, to favour the convention of a council in an imperial city in order to reform 
the catholic Church and to combat the «damnable sects» of protestants. 
As a fifth matter in which Charles showed himself as uncompromising, on should 
also consider his consequent intervention in city govemments. After all the urban revolts 
in the Low Countries, in Spain, in Italy and in southem Germany, he steadily had 
the guilds excluded from the local administration and put it in the hands of an oligarchy. 
The series started as early as his so-caUed Joyous Entry in Ghent 1515, which had 
been the occasion for popular turmoil in favour of urban privüeges. The comuneros 
revolts in Spain could not be immediately subdued with great military power, but it 
nevertheless resulted in the exclusión of the popular organisations from the admin-
istration. After the occupation of Toumai, in 1521, the guilds were excluded from the 
administration of the city. In 1525, 1528 and 1532, «rebeUiousness, commotion and 
various crimes» in «s-Hertogenbosch and Brussels led to repression and the imposition 
of new ordinances which «took power out of the hands of the people, of which I certainly 
approve», as Charles wrote to the govemess, his aunt Margaret. The most dramatic 
case is the well-known Ghent revolt of 1537-1540, after which a demonstrative repression 
was led by the emperor in person, and the whole corporative structure was reformed 
in an authoritarian way, breaking the power of the labour aristocracy of their political 
representatives. Similarly, in 1546-1547, Charles's campaign in southem Germany resul-
ted equally in the reformation of the administration of dozens of cities in an oligarchic 
•-' Ihidem, pp. 292-293. 
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sense '^. Through his whole reign, he systematically favoured local élites with whom 
it was easier to strike deals than with unruly artisans and peasants. 
While Charles undeniably was driven by a number of principies to which he kept 
firmly, and in some cases even in a stubbom way, in other matters he gave obviously 
in and showed his pragmatic or tolerant side. In this section again, five domains will 
be discussed. After having observed in the first section of this paper the emperor's 
insistence on the legitimacy of the claims of the empire and of his dynasty, here we 
have to point to his leniency with regard to claims which he saw to be unattainable 
in practice. This evidendy applies to his non-intervention for the recovery of the duchy 
of Burgundy and of Württemberg, which was lost for Habsburg in 1534. He equally 
showed much patience with William of Cleves, whose rights on the duchy of Guelders 
Charles claimed to be invaüd, but whom he subdued only in 1543, after five years 
of tolerance. Most striking, however, are Charles's repeated proposals put forward to 
Francis I in 1536, 1539 and in the negotiations at Crépy in 1544, to cede either the 
duchy of Milán or the whole of the Low Countries, as a bride's gift in the case of 
a marriage between one his own or Ferdinand's daughters with a younger son of the 
king. He obviously considered such an alliance as a formidable guarantee for a lasting 
peace between Valois and Habsburg, which in tum was a necessary condition for the 
pursuit of the emperor's primary mission as the protector of the Church. The deal 
was finally impeded in 1545, both by the opposition of the king's eldest son Henry 
and by the death of the envisaged bridegroom. Charles's repeated propositions clearly 
demónstrate a hierarchy among his principies: for him, peace among the Christian kings 
in order to protect the unity of Christendom evidently prevailed over Habsburg dynastic 
interests. 
The second domain in which Charles showed his pragmatic side, is that of his poHtical 
alliances. Notwithstanding his harsh rejection of any form of reÜgious «sectarianism», 
he continued his alliance with Henry VIH, and he in the end accepted to come to 
terms with the Lutheran King Christian IH of Denmark. In October 1545, Charles 
even struck a truce with the Turks, in order to have his hands free against the Germán 
protestant princes. In 1552, he went as far as to strike an alliance with the breaker 
of the imperial peace and protestant Albrecht Alcibiades of Brandenburg, simply because 
he badly needed his military support for the campaign in Lorraine. In all these cases, 
strategic reasons prevailed over religious rigor. When he really needed the support or 
neutraÜty of an heretic or heathen. Charles was able to put aside his religious fanaticism. 
The third domain of Charles's pragmatism was, curiously enough, religión. Personally, 
he had no deep interest in dogmatic matters, but he showed great wíUingness to leave 
these to theologians from catholic and reformed sides, hoping that they might reach 
an agreement among themselves. From the Diet in Augsburg in 1530 onwards, he fav-
" BLOCKMANS, W., «The Emperor's Subjects», en SOLY, H . (ed.), Charles V 1500-1558 and his time, 
Antwerp, 1999 (in Spanish translation: Yuste, 2000), pp. 258-272. 
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oured talks between theologians of different obediences. By this procedure, he provided 
the representatives of the Augsburg Confession with some kind of legitimacy and he 
even was preparad to accept the agreement in the comrtiittee and issue it as a concordat. 
It were, however, the negativa reactions in wider circles that impeded the agreement 
to be issued as an imperial law " . In 1532, a new agreement between catholics and 
protestants was reached in Numberg, including some guarantees for non-prosecution 
of the latter. In retum for rrülitary support against the Turks, Charles tolerated the 
progressive implantation of Protestantism, believing that a council would soon meet 
to settle the dogmatic and ecclesiastical matters. Things remained very much the same 
during the emperor's lasting absence, which meant that in many regions Protestantism 
could expand freely. When Charles retumed in 1541, he installed again a theological 
«Colloquium» in the margin of the Diet at Regensburg, which presented a partial agree-
ment, refuted again by the pohtical representatives of both sides. During many years, 
he thus tried to reach agreements by negotiation, accepting some of the principies of 
the protestants. He may have underestimated the strong motivation on the protestan! 
side, and he certainly faüed to take into account the reluctance of the Curia against 
the general council he was advocating. By 1545, he became aware that the cleavage 
he had contributed to, had become unbridgeable. In the meantime, he had tolerated 
the spread of the «sects» in order «to avoid greater grief» in the form of further Turkish 
progress. 
Looking at the practice of reügious persecution, the number of executed death 
penalties that can be traced in the extant sources in some provinces of the Low Countries 
between 1520 and 1555 amounts to 169, the total of persecutions to 1473. Extrapolated 
to the whole of the XVII Provinces, the latter might rise to somewhere between 4,000 
and 8,000 cases, with peaks between 1542-1545 and 1551-1555 " . The sharp tone of 
the ordinances against the «heretics» might have frightened people, but the reality of 
the persecution was that no more than 0.009 per cent of the population have ever 
been inculpated and 0.001 per cent executed. No wonder that Protestantism expanded 
rapidly in the Low Countries as well. Was this intentional tolerance from the side of 
the govemment? The repetition of the ordinances rather points in the direction of pro-
tection by the lower authorities, which hampered the implementation of imperial policy. 
A similar observation can be made in the domain of legislation, which we might 
consider as the fourth domain of the emperor's pragmatism. In the period 1506-1555 
a yearly average of 37 ordinances were issued for the whole of the XVII Provinces 
of the Low Countries. They reflect a tendency of the central govemment towards the 
homogenisation of law, which had grown from many different local and regional cus-
'•* GRUNDMANN, A., «Die Beschwerden der deutschen Narion auf den Reichstagen der Reformation», 
en LuTZ, H., y KOHLER, A. (eds.), Aus der Arheit an den Reichstagen unter Kaiser Karl V, Góttingen, 1986, 
pp. 95-105. 
" GOOSENS, A., Les Inquisitions modemes dans íes PaysSas méridionaux {1320-16}}), Brussels, 1998, 11, 
pp. 95-107, 188-192. 
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tomary traditions. In October 1531, a series of legal measures reformed the structure 
of the central govemment and prescribed a wide variety of rules of public order, some-
what similar to those issued ene year earlier in the empire. It was also ordered that 
all local authoiities were due to write down within six months their customary law, 
in order to have it scrutinized by the provincial and central councüs of justice and 
to be issued as «homologised» law. The result was extremely meagre: although the 
ordinance had been re-issued in 1532, 1540 and 1546, by 1579 only 334 local laws 
had been presented to the provincial councils, of which no more than 21 had been 
homologised '*. Insofar as there was centralisation of govemment and legislation, it hardly 
functioned on the level of the emperor's dominions beyond his own person and his 
immediate environment of courtiers, councillors and secretarias. Charles did not impose 
foreign nJers in his different territories in reaOy significant numbers. This implied that 
each locality, each province and each kingdom continued very much to apply its tra-
ditional rules, notwithstanding some hopeless endeavours from the emperor to impose 
more homogeneity. 
The field in which the empire was after all most integrated, was that of money 
and fínance, since the empire and its bankers moved subsidies from one región to 
another, dejjending on the needs of the moment. Financial administration is the fifth 
domain to be considered from the viewpoint of the emperor's pragmatism. The fiscal 
pressure rose considerably during Charles's reign, even if one takes in account the rising 
population and the economic growth. War years provoked sudden steep increases in 
tax demands, which the representative assemblies grudgingly accepted in most cases. 
These increases could only be imposed by negotiating all kinds of favours with the 
delegates, for their constituencies as weü as personally. In this process, the representative 
bodies obtained more power and financial retums for themselves. So, they collaborated 
up to a point with the govemment, but also obstructed any systematic tax reform aiming 
at a more equal distribution of the burden. Govemment initiatives in this respect, taxing 
by percentage wealth and trade were introduced in the early 1540s but met with such 
a fierce resistance from the local élites, that they remained unsuccessful and had to 
be withdrawn ''^ . 
Are these cases to be considered as examples of the impossibiüty for an imperial 
govemment in the first half of the sixteenth century to impose any kind of administrative 
homogeneity and observation of the centraOy imposed law? Certainly, the emperor 
repeatedly showed highly impatient by the slow reactions of his territories to his com-
mands. He simply had no cholee than to accept the slowness of the changes he wanted 
" MooK-MAN VAN KAPPE.N, O., «Stadtxechtsreformationen des 16. Jahrhunderts in den Niederlanden», 
enLexLoci, Nijmegen, 2000, pp. 139-148. 
" BLOCKMA.\S, W., «The Low Countries in the Middle Ages», en BO.NNEY, R. (ed.), The Rise of the 
Fiscal State in Eumpe, ca. 1200-1815, Oxford, 1999 pp. 297-305; L'escarcelle de Charles Quint. Moiinaies et 
fitiances au xiif siécle, Brussels, 2000. 
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to introduce, and to live with various arrangements with local powers, which contributed 
to the perpetuation of the traditions. 
What then, was the share of principie, pragmatism or, maybe, strategy in Charles's 
reign? From 1535 onwards, warfare dominated all other aspects of political and economic 
ufe in his dominions. This may be considerad as a consequence of his principal political 
aims, directed at the protection of Christianity and the Church, and the preservation 
of their unity. For them, he esteemed no price too high. Beyond Charles's control was 
the sharp increase in the costs of warfare, as a result of the rmlitary revolution which 
necessitated huge investments in the building of fortresses and artülery. For the same 
reasons, armies had to increase in size by a factor three, while staying in the garrisons 
and in the fields almost without interruption. This led in a few years to a general doubling 
of the per capita fiscal burden in real terms, and to a tremendous increase of the pubÜc 
debt. Economic ufe suffered severely, financial markets became exhausted by 1555. 
In his farewell address to the States General in Brussels in October 1555, Charles 
deplored this nearly continuous warfare, but blamed the others for the need to wage 
them. If true, this would imply that the emperor was unable to pursue his own strategy, 
but instead had to react to threats from his enemies. Indeed, all his major miütary 
campaigns from 1535 onwards reacted on aggression. 
Charles had to face the unprecedented, unrepeated and probably impossible mission 
to rule over a huge and scattered empire in a time of formidable challenges. Any other, 
maybe more talented ruler, may also have failed in his place. In his defence, one should 
observe that he managed to defend and even expand his territories against ongoing 
French and Ottoman attacks. But he failed in two of his other main aims: he failed 
to «exterminate the heresy» and to keep the Habsburg empire united. His lack of 
strategic flexibility, in particular his insufficient understanding of the dogmatic moti-
vations of the Reformation, of the effects of protracted mass propaganda and of the 
situation in Germany generally, are to be considered as the reasons of this double failure. 
A more flexible ruler such as Ferdinand may have found more peaceful and lasting 
Solutions. 
189 
